I accepted this gracious offer to address you in a weak moment when my friends who are psychiatrists had taken me to task for my article which appeared in the Toronto Star, and when I was filled with guilt about what I had written. But now, having just completed the Harvey Holly murder trial, and having watched psychiatrist against psychiatrist and psychologist against psychologist, I say "that was then".
I recently read in the Police Journal an article about psychiatrists which related that in 1973 when "skyjacking" was first making the headlines, an "enterprising airline. .. engaged two psychiatrists to arrest anyone who showed signs of mental instability. .. within a few minutes of commencing his duties, one of the psychiatrists arrested the other." The reason for this was obvious. The lawyer who was scheduled to take this flight was late and ...
The role of psychiatry in our courts is not a simple question. Let us first look at the attitude of psychiatrists today in our court system and what the adversary system is all about.
A psychiatrist, like any other expert witness, or indeed like any other witness, rarely emerges from the experience of testifying in our judicial system, without being subjected to and having to fend off serious attacks upon his intelligence, his honesty, his status and his dignity. These Can. Psychlatr. Assoc. J. Vol. 23 (1978) assaults are naturally enough launched by the party to the court process who is adversely affected by the psychiatrist's testimony. Unfortunately, some psychiatrists perceive these attacks as a form of denunciation, either of their profession or themselves, and react to the trial process as though it were a battleground upon which they must fight to prove their mettle. They forget that a trial, and in particular a criminal trial, is only a social ritual which is styled to meet some of the practical needs of our society as a fact-finding process, and is historically entrenched as an adversarial system. Before we can begin to understand the role of the psychiatrist in our courts, I believe the psychiatrist has to understand and accept the rules of the adversary system and the role of the lawyer in the process.
This adversary system pits the opposing parties, each for his own cause, against the other. The process ensures a conflict and a struggle to resolve it. Each party takes a position and endeavours to persuade. We no longer have the simpler methods of trial by ordeal and trial by combat; we have in their stead trial by advocacy.
The lawyer, as advocate, must give entire devotion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of the client's rights, and the utmost exertion of his learning and abilities. The classic statement of this ideal was carried by Lord Brougham when he represented the Queen in Queen Caroline's Case. Threatening to defend his client on an issue that would literally have brought down the Kingdom, Brougham stated: An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
What he is saying is, let justice be done -that is, for my client let justice be done -though the heavens fall. This is the kind of advocacy that I would wish as a client and it is the kind that I feel bound to provide as an advocate.
However, the rest of the system must not be left out of the picture and indeed cannot be ignored. The adversarial system, by its nature, supposes an advocate for the opposite party, but fortunately it also provides an impartial judge over both. Therefore, despite the advocate's arguments, the heavens need not fall -not unless justice requires that they do. This is the framework within which all legal issues are resolved and it is the framework into which all witnesses, lay and expert alike, are called to testify. The witness must function within this framework because no other exists. The advocate too performs his duties within this system and it is the very nature of the system which requires a close participation between the lawyer, as advocate, and the psychiatrist, as witness, in the planning of the legal strategy whenever a sanity issue is present.
The next important fact before coming to the role of the psychiatrist in the courtroom is that the legal profession does not perceive you as impartial.
I do not agree with the crude charge that under our system the expert witness sells his opinion. Such a charge is too base to defend by more than the simple statement that I do not believe it happens. However, the adversarial process does make it difficult for the psychiatrist to remain aloof or detached from the fray -as well, under cross-examination, the expert is expected, in our system, to defend his expert status, his clinical facts, his professional knowledge, and to justify his opinions. In this sense, it is absurd to even pretend that the psychiatric witness remains neutral or non-adversarial in such a legal procedure. The witness by virtue of the system, must identify himself with his expressed opinions and become the advocate of those opinions. In this sense there can never really be a neutral impartial witness.
However, it is this intangible sense of impartial expertise which breeds the continuance of the adversary process -the notion that both sides present their positions to the jury, allowing the jury to choose from within the quagmire of conflicting testimony, that position which they judge to be most credible. All that a lawyer can attempt to do is expose whatever shortcomings or vulnerable areas that may exist in the diagnostic technique and biases of the psychiatrist or psychologist. We crossexamine to test the situation.
Dr. Bernard Diamond points out in his article on the fallacy of the impartial witness, that to use the word impartial, even for a psychiatrist, is to create the illusion of psychiatric omniscience. He concludes, such an illusion may be good public relations for psychiatrists, but they are not helpful for the administration of justice.
Mr. Justice Bazelon of the United States Federal Court recently stated strong arguments for continuing to subject psychiatric opinions to the adversarial process of vigorous cross-examination. He said:
Psychiatry, I suppose, is the ultimate wizardry. My experience has shown that in no case is it more difficult to elicit productive and reliable expert testimony than in cases that call on the knowledge and practice of psychiatry ... The discipline of psychiatry has direct relevance to cases involving human behaviour. One might hope that the psychiatrists would open up their reservoirs of knowledge in the courtroom. Unfortunately, in my experience, they try to limit their testimony to conclusory statements couched in psychiatric terminology. Thereafter, they take shelter in a defensive resistance to questions about the facts that are or ought to be in their possession; they thus refuse to submit their opimons to the scrutiny that the adversary processdemands.
He further states, referring to the adversary system and the role of expert witnesses in it:
Precisely because the expert testifies to a conclusion, and to one that inevitably favours one side, he must be open to crossexamination by the other side of the facts and premises on which he rests his conclusion. The jury is entitled to know of differences of opinion and in outright conflict involved in psychiatric diagnosis.
Psychiatrists testifying in our courts of law should keep in mind that the law of our land recognizes their testimony only as an opinion; one which the law permits to be attacked and contradicted. It should also be pointed out, whether or not it is a fact or again simply another opinion, that our leading law journals and reviews have cast great doubt upon not only the reliability but, the validity of psychiatric diagnoses. This literature and other forensic publications illustrate to the legal profession, the difficulty of proper diagnoses in the psychiatric sphere. According to one source, there is within the broad diagnostic categories, research findings which indicate that, on the average, one cannot expect to find agreement in more than 60% of cases between two psychiatrists, or stated differently, "there is about as much chance that a different expert would come to some different conclusion as there is that the other expert would agree."
Let me tell you what we, as lawyers, read about you ---'-I do not suggest this is correct but it is what our literature is saying. In one study, researchers measured the diagnostic agreement between two or three psychiatrists who jointly interviewed 52 patients in a psychiatric clinic. The three psychiatrists agreed on specific diagnoses in only 21 percent of the cases, and totally disagreed in 31 percent. When asked whether a patient fit into one of the more general categories of psychopathology (mental deficiency, character disorder, psychosis, neurosis, and normal) the pair of psychiatrists agreed from 58 to 67 percent of the time, and the trio of psychiatrists agreed only 46 percent of the time. The study suggests that specific psychiatric diagnoses (such as hysterical neurosis, or psychotic depression) are hardly reliable at all, and that broader categories are of limited reliability. The study found that only in 3 of 22 cases did all three psychiatrists agree that the patient was "pathologically abnormal" .
Legal literature also tells us that studies for reliability, conducted under such controlled conditions should produce higher rates of diagnostic reliability than is likely to be obtained in actual psychiatric practice. Outside these studies, our literature tells us that with the lack of controls such factors as inexperienced psychiatrists, particularized interviewing techniques and conditions, definitional ambiguities and biases, semantic differences, and so on, all contribute to lower diagnostic reliability scores.
Many studies that we, as lawyers, read conclude that psychiatric judgments are not particularly reliable. But, psychiatrists act as if they were. It is clear that psychiatrists disagree frequently on broad diagnostic judgments; they disagree more often than not on more specific diagnoses; and important consequences flow from the introduction in a judicial setting of one or another of the possible but unreliable expert categorizations. When such important issues as the liberty of the subject are involved, the available evidence surely does not justify the abrogation of the traditional safeguards afforded by our legal adversarial system to a well-meaning but disputed belief in the reliability of psychiatric judgment.
Presently, the psychiatrist is the only expert who is asked to testify as to his opinion of a man's responsibility and as to the punishment that man should receive. The toxicologist may testify as to the amount of poison in a victim's body and may give an opinion based on this fact as to whether the amount was sufficient to cause death. The fingerprint or ballistics experts give opinions which are strictly limited to their particular fields of scientific competence. But, not one of any of these or other experts are ever asked to give an opinion as to the guilt or degree of responsibility of the offender. Only the psychiatrist is asked to testify, answer questions and give his own opinion on issues which go beyond his own training or competence.
One interesting point that the legal literature makes is that in a study prepared by the American Bar Foundation in 1970, the results showed that psychiatric experts associated with the public mental hospital system tended to view mental illness from a different perspective than do those doctors engaged in pri vate practice.
With these factors, though I do not suppose to say, nor do I think they would be an exhaustive list, it is only natural, again remembering our adversarial judicial process, to prepare and pursue the basis for the psychiatrist's opinion in cross-examination. It has nothing to do with your sincerity or integrity, only your accuracy. The role of defense counsel, and of the psychiatrist as expert, was the subject of comment by the United States Supreme Court in the case of The function of the psychiatrist is not to try to tell the jurors what verdict they should render but rather portray as fully and completely as possible the mental and emotional makeup of the defendant, how his emotional and intellectual processes work and how they affected his capacity to control his conduct both generally and in the specific situation surrounding the crime charged. They should portray the "inner man" as best they can without fanciful speculation. The opinions must be based on "reasonable medical certainty" which has always been the legal standard for expert medical opinions. The experts cannot be expected to know all these answers as to every defendant but these are the areas in which they should be examined and cross-examined extensively.
That court went on to give an instruction of sorts to psychiatrists called upon to testify in a trial involving the "insanity defense" and points out the likelihood of how the expert's opinion will be attacked by the opposing advocates:
More specifically, counsel may try to undermine your opinions as lacking certainty or adequate bases. We recognize that an opinion may be merely a balance of probability and that we cannot demand absolute certainty. Thus you may testify to opinions that are within the zone of reasonable medical certainty. Mr. Justice Bazelon who was a member of that court later added this comment to the court's judgment:
It may be that this instruction will not significantly improve the adjudication of criminal responsibility. Then we may be forced to consider an absolute prohibition on the use of conclusory legal labels. Or it may be that psychiatry cannot provide sufficient data relevant to a determination of criminal responsibility no matter what the rules of evidence are. If so, we may be forced to eliminate the insanity defense altogether or refashion it in a way which is not tied so tightly to the medical model.
Psychiatrists, despite what we read in our literature concerning their idiosyncratic influences relating to diagnosis and prognosis, are, every day, allowed and asked by our court system and our laws to predict whether a particular person is "dangerous". If what we read is even vaguely correct, namely, that psychiatrists have difficulty dealing with their own broad categories of mental illness, then how reliable is an expert's opinion within this vague concept of "dangerousness"? Medical schools do not even offer courses in the prediction of dangerous behaviour, nor are there textbooks explaining the method and criteria by which such assessments are to be made. Rappeport, for instance, conducted a thorough search of the literature and found "no articles that could assist [psychiatrists] to any great extent in determining who might be dangerous, particularly before he commits an offence." Moreover, we are told, no traits, symptoms, or conditions which are useful predictors of dangerous behaviour have been identified.
We are also told that even if psychiatrists could accurately determine which persons are mentally ill, that determination would not assist them in predicting dangerousness because there is no correlation between mental illness and dangerous behaviour. Moreover, dangerous behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. Guttmacher tells us that "One cannot anticipate with accuracy the social situations which the released patient will have to meet". It would appear then that in all probability, whether a person will commit a dangerous act depends in large part upon fortuitous and unpredictable events.
Perhaps the most striking evidence in support of these statements comes from the results of the United States Supreme Court decision in the Baxstrom case: The court held that 969 persons remaining in the New York State Department of Corrections hospitals after their prison terms had expired must be released, and committed civilly, if at all. Each of the 969 patients had been detained in maximum-security hospitals because psychiatrists determined that they were mentally ill and too dangerous for release, or even for transfer to civil hospitals. Nevertheless, one year after the patients were transferred to civil hospitals, 147 had been discharged to the community and the 702 who remained were found to present no special problems to the hospital staff. Only 7 patients were found to be so difficult to manage or so dangerous as to require recommitment to a Department of Corrections hospital. Several years later, 27 percent of the patients were living in the community, only 9 had been convicted of a crime (only 2 of felonies), and only 3 percent were in a correctional facility or hospital for the criminally insane.
Psychiatrists, it would appear from the literature made available to us as lawyers, are rather more inaccurate than some other experts and mainly because of the lack of actuarial devices available to them. Dershowitz offers a reasoned explanation for what he terms the psychiatrists' tendency to this particular type of error -overprediction.
One reason for this overprediction is that a psychiatrist almost never learns about his erroneous predictions of violence, for predicted assailants are generally incarcerated and have little opportunity to prove or disprove the prediction; but he always learns about his erroneous predictions of nonviolence -often from newspaper headlines announcing the crime. This higher visibility of erroneous predictions of nonviolence inclines him, whether consciously or unconsciously, to overpredictviolentbehaviour.
Another author comments that, "in human terms, what the Baxstrom experience tells us is that but for a Supreme Court decision, nearly 1,000 human beings would have lived the rest of their lives behind bars, without even the limited amenities afforded to civil patients, because a few psychiatrists in their considered opinion, thought they were 'dangerous', and no one asked for proof." However, the confidence of our courts in the psychiatrist's ability to predict violence serves to legitimate, intensive types of social control.
It could be argued that jurists are not capable of deciding upon the responsibility of mentally ill offenders without receiving considerable direction from psychiatrists. As well, it can easily be argued that the legal system has forced the problem upon the psychiatrist. However, there are psychiatrists who do not fully appreciate the perception the bar has of the important role they do indeed play in the administration of justice. There are probably many psychiatrists who are totally adverse to a legal system that does not allow them to apply their professional judgment to appropriate questions of psychological reality and not philosophical and legalistic rules.
When a lawyer gets involved in an absurd situation such as advocating a form of treatment, as opposed to a punishmentoriented disposition of his client, he appeals to the psychiatrist for help. Then the psychiatrists, instead of saving the situation, make it worse through their own uncertainties and controversies, having to do for the most part with words, not with ideas. The common sense citizen would know that a man ought to be confined, but, the argument in our system has to do with the label which we attach and use to justify the type of confinement. A man has to have a psychosis; has to be insane; has to be irresponsible or dangerous, and as soon as these words are mentioned, the struggle begins. The experts cannot agree among themselves or with the lawyers, what these words are supposed to mean, or do mean. As Menninger points out:
Lawyers, like psychiatrists, are a part of an organization, a system within the great social system. They study and work and talk together on the basis of a philosophy, partly tacit, partly proclaimed. They do not all agree, of course, but theydevelopcharacteristic ways of looking at things. They develop value systems based in part on the nature of their work.
Needless to say, whenever the psychiatrist enters the lawyer's organization, a system concerned with placing or rebutting blame for specific acts of deviant behaviour, the two languages and philosophies of the professions are of little help in establishing a meaningful communication with one another. To quote Neil Ross:
Despite contrary appearances, lawyers and psychiatrists are incapable of communication on some issues because the two disciplines, although of common philosophical origin, have in terms of method, taken diverse paths ... some common grounddoes exist but both disciplines have to re-define their assumptions and methods if successful communication is to be madepossible.
Perhaps when the psychiatrist better understands the lawyer's role as advocate within an adversarial system; and understands that cross-examination is not an attack on his profession, but rather the only judicial method available to question the basis upon which his opinion stands, his role as an expert will take on new dimensions. Summary
In this article, the author explores the relationship between the lawyer as advocate and the psychiatrist as expert. He argues that the role of the psychiatrist in aiding the Court in the determination of relevant issues is one of increasing importance. Often the diagnostic opinions offered by the psychiatrist border on conclusory legal determinations. As such, those opinions must necessarily be subjected to the testing of adversarial processes. The role of the psychiatrist is to proffer a relevant opinion while nevertheless realizing that the inexact nature of the science limits the use such an opinion may have. The lawyer as adversary must subject that opinion to as rigorous an examination as possible. This examination is not an affront to the psychiatrist but rather an attempt to explore and expose the definitiveness of that opinion. It is through this combination of realized opinionating and, adversarial examination that relevant legal-medical determinations can best be made within the confines of our existing judicial mode of dispute settlement.
Resume Dans cet article, l'auteur explore la relation qui s'etablit entre I'avocat en tant que defenseur et le psychiatre en tant qu'expert. II soutient que le role du psychiatre qui vient en aide ala Cour en vue de determiner les questions pertinentes est d'une importance grandissante. Souvent les opinions diagnostiques presentees par le psychiatre s'apparentent a des conclusions legales determinantes. En tant que telles, ces opinions doivent necessairernent etre soumises au processus de contestation par des adversaires. Le role du psychiatre est d'ernettre des opinions pertinentes tout en realisant cependant que la nature inexacte de la science limite l'emploi qu'on peut faire de telles opinions. L'avocat, en tant qu'adversaire, doit soumettre ces opinions a un examen le plus rigoureux possible. Cet examen n'est pas un affront fait au psychiatre, mais plutot une tentative d'investiguer et de mettre en evidence les opinions de ce demier, C'est par la realisation d'un examen ala fois serre et conteste qu' on peut prendre des decisions medico-legales pertinentes, tout en demeurant dans les limites du mode de reglement des conflits dans notre systeme judiciaire actuel.
